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Abstract 
This article examines the legal consequences of the acquisition of a new nationality for the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees. The article argues that since the right of return is independent of the refugee status, the 
cessation of the latter should not necessarily abrogate the former. By examining the underpinnings of the 
right of return to one’s own country, especially the link between the individual and her territory, this article 
argues that this link is somehow weakened in a situation of naturalization in a different country. However, 
this weakening of the link should not automatically lead to the deprivation of rights. The circumstances that 
lead refugees to leave their country of origin, the circumstances preventing their return, and the decisions 
made by the individuals in view of their available options should be examined.  
 
Much of the discussion about Palestinian refugees displaced in 19481 has focused on the question 
of their right to return to the areas they were displaced from (what is now Israel), which they see 
as their homeland. Many have made the case for the right of return based on a wide range of 
international law instruments, and emphasized the importance for this right as a central pillar for 
                                                 
* PhD, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Lecturer, The City Law School, City University London. I wish 
to thank Obiora Okafor, Susan Akram, Jeff Handmaker, Ingrid Jaradat Gassner and Sujith Xavier for their 
comments on earlier drafts. Any errors or omissions are mine.   
1
 Over the past 65 years, Palestinians have become the victims of many waves of displacement as a result of wars, 
political instability, and Israeli state policies. According to a survey, about 7.4 million Palestinians have been 
forcibly displaced since 1948.. Those displaced fall within four main categories: (1) those displaced during and as a 
result of the 1948 war (usually referred to as Palestinian refugees or Palestine refugees); (2) those displaced during 
and as a result of the 1967 war (usually referred to as “displaced persons”); and (3) those who were displaced 
outside the area of Palestine who are neither 1967 refugees nor 1948 refugees. The fourth category refers to 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), who were internally displaced within Israel in 1948, or in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories during and after the 1967 war. See BADIL, “Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons 2010-2012: Volume VII” (2012), online: BADIL <http://www.badil.org/en/press-releases/142-
2012/3638-press-eng-53> [Survey of Palestinian Refugees]. The focus of this article is the first category, that is, 
Palestinians displaced during and as a result of the 1948 war. As of 2012, this amounted to 5.8 million refugees, 4.8 
million of whom are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. For 
detailed historical accounts on the issue of Palestinian refugees, see Benny MORRIS, The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Walid KHALIDI, “Why did the 
Palestinians Leave, Revisited” (2005) 34 Journal of Palestine Studies 42; Ilan PAPPE, The Ethnic Cleansing of 
Palestine (Oxford: One World, 2007). For a detailed analysis of the political underpinnings of the Israeli policies 
,which led to the different waves of displacement, see Nur MASALHA, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept 
of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought 1882-1948 (Washington D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992); Nur 
MASALHA, A Land Without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians 1949-96 (London: Faber and Faber, 
1997). 
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resolving the Palestinian refugee problem and achieving a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict.2 Others have argued that such a right does not exist, or, if it does exist, it does not apply 
to Palestinian refugees who were displaced in 1948 because of the particularities of their 
situation, the context of the war which led to their flight, the subsequent developments in the 
region, security considerations, and the demographic changes that have happened since then.3 
Sixty-five years have passed since the beginning of the Palestinian refugee problem, and due to 
the long period of time that has elapsed, many Palestinian refugees have since acquired a new 
nationality. Some had acquired their nationality according to the legislation of certain states.4 
Acquisition of a new nationality in the case of refugees results in the cessation of refugee status 
according to Article 1C of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
Convention).5 When the refugee status is terminated as a result of the acquisition of a new 
citizenship, the question of the implications for the right of this group of people to return to their 
country of origin arises. This article, thus, aims at answering this question as it relates to 
Palestinian refugees expelled or displaced during the 1948 war.  
International refugee law contemplates three possible solutions for the refugee problem: 
voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and assimilation.6 The 1951 Convention provides that with 
the realization of one of these three solutions, the refugee status will come to an end, as 
prescribed in Article 1C. The last two solutions raise the issue of the implications of the 
acquisition of citizenship on the right of a refugee to return to her country of origin. This 
                                                 
2
  An International Law Analysis of the Major  United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question, Study 
by W. Thomas MALLISON and Sally MALLISON published at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, UN Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4; Kathleen LAWAND, “The Right to Return 
of Palestinians in International Law” (1996) 8 International Journal of Refugee Law 532; John QUIGLEY, 
“Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return” (1998) 3 Harvard International Law Journal 171; Susan AKRAM 
and Terry REMPLE, “Recommendations for Durable Solutions for Palestinians Refugees” (2000-2001) 11 Palestine 
Yearbook of International Law 1; Gail BOWLING, The 1948 Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right of 
Return: An International Law Analysis (Bethlehem: BADIL Resource Center, 2007); Victor KATTAN, “The 
Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians” (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 67. 
3
 See for example Kurt Rene RADLEY, “The Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return in International Law” 
(1978) 72 American Journal of International Law 586; Ruth LAPIDOTH, “The Right of Return in International 
Law, with Special Reference to the Palestinian Refugees” (1986) 16 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 103; Justus 
WEINER, “The Palestinian Refugees’ ‘Right to Return’ and the Peace Process” (1997) 20 Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 1; Lewis SAIDEMAN, “Do Palestinian Refugees have a Right of 
Return to Israel? An Examination of the Scope of and Limitations on the Right of Return” (2004) 44 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 829; Na’ama CARMI, “Immigration and Return: The Israeli Palestinian Case” (2005) 
32 Philosophia 21; Yaffa ZILBERSHATS, “International Law and the Palestinian Right of Return to the State of 
Israel” in Eyal BENVENISTI, et al., eds., Israel and the Palestinian Refugees (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute, 
2007), 191; Andrew KENT, “Evaluating the Palestinians’ Claimed Right of Return” (2012-2013) 34 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 149. 
4
 Jordan, for example, bestowed nationality on Palestinian refugees according to the Jordanian Nationality Law of 
1954. See Lex TAKKENBERG, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at 155.  
5
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954) 
[1951 Convention].  
6
 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, GA Res. 427(V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 
(1950), at para. 1. 
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question becomes more important and critical especially in situations in which the refugee has 
lost the citizenship of her country of origin, as in the case of the Palestinian refugees.7 
Does the cessation of refugee status of a Palestinian refugee as a result of the acquisition of 
citizenship preclude the right to return to her country of origin? It could be argued that since 
refugee law merely requires the facilitation of the voluntary repatriation of refugees and does not 
explicitly create the right to return8 the cessation of refugee status does not affect this right . 
Nowak, for example, asserts that: 
 
As soon as the political situation in the country of origin of refugees or displaced persons improves, and 
these persons wish to return to their “original home country”, the establishment of a “second home country” 
must not be invoked for the purpose of preventing them from returning home, even if masses of people are 
claiming this right.9  
 
On the other hand, it was argued, in the context of the Palestinian refugees who have acquired 
a new nationality, that the “[o]peration of Article 1C [of the Refugee Convention] (acceptance of 
new citizenship) terminates the right of return because the Palestinians’ ‘own country’ under 
article 12 (4) of the ICCPR is their country of new nationality, not Israel”.10 The rationale behind 
this reasoning is: 
 
Conventions and laws in general ought to be interpreted in a plain language manner that harmonizes them 
rather than in a manner that places them at odds with each other. If a refugee has accepted new nationality, he 
now has a place that he can "enter" and call home; his new state of protection is his “own country.” A 
previously stateless person who has accepted new citizenship should be seen as having a country he can call 
his “own.” Once he has a country he can call his own, the former refugee has a right of return to that new 
country of which he is a national, not his former country, in this case Israel.11 
 
This position is based on a specific reading of two international law rules: one based on 
Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),12 while the 
second is based on the cessation clause of the 1951 Convention, in an approach which seeks to 
harmonize different provisions of international law in order to create a coherent body of rules. 
Another commentator, Yaffa Zilbershats, has argued, in the context of Article 12(4) of the 
ICCPR, that the lapse of time since the displacement of the Palestinian refugees has rendered any 
effective link to Israel artificial, and that “Palestinians have much more stronger effective links 
                                                 
7
 Palestinian refugees were citizens of Mandate Palestine according to the Palestine Citizenship Order , Official 
Gazette, 16 September 1925, 460-78 [Palestine Citizenship Order]. According to the rules of state succession, 
persons who are habitual residents of a new state ipso facto become nationals of that state, and, therefore, 
Palestinians, who were habitual residents of territories that fell under Israeli control, a category which includes the 
Palestinian refugees, were entitled to Israeli nationality. The Palestinian refugees were denationalized en masse in 
1952 in a discriminatory manner after Israel enacted the Citizenship Act-1952 [Citizenship Act-1952] which 
regulates matters related to nationality in Israel. See Kattan, supra note 2.  
8
 See Art. 1 of the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Annex to GA Res. 
A/RES/428(V), UN Doc. A/1775 (1950) [UNHCR Statute]. 
9
 Manfred NOWAK, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel Verlag, 
2005) at 288 (emphasis added). 
10
 Saideman, supra note 3 at 863 (emphasis added). 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force 
23 March 1976) [ICCPR]. Israel signed the ICCPR on 19 December 1966 and ratified it on 3 October 1991.  
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to the states, in which they have resided for decades”.13 This in turn means that Israel is not 
“their own country”, and, therefore, they do not have a right to enter Israel according to the 
ICCPR because such a right would apply only to those who have effective links with Israel, 
which Palestinian refugees lack.14 
Only a very small number of authors, who argue that the 1948 Palestinian refugees do have 
the right to return based on international human rights law, have touched upon the issue of the 
acquisition of a new citizenship. Those who did touch upon the issue, however, did so in passing. 
Kathleen Lawand, for example, does not tackle the issue of the acquisition of citizenship 
directly, but provides an elaborate analysis of the meaning of the term “his own country”, based 
on the Nottebohm case and the effective link between the individual and the state.15 Her focus is 
on the effect of time on the genuine link. In this regard, she sees the passage of time as a factor 
eroding the genuine link, but adds that the actions of the state of origin should also be taken into 
consideration.16 Her article was published before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights 
Committee issued its General Comment on Article 12 of the ICCPR and its decision in Charles 
Stewart v. Canada.17 John Quigley also deals with the issue only in the context of the Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan. While he states that “seeking nationality elsewhere might be taken as a 
waiver of the individual’s right to his original nationality”,18 he argues, based on the 
circumstances in which Jordan had granted nationality to the Palestinian refugees, that there was 
no intention by the refugees to renounce their connection to Palestine.19 His analysis of the issue, 
however, is limited and cannot be used to assess the rights of other Palestinian refugees or 
former refugees.  
This article, thus, aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of the acquisition of new 
nationality on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. This question has arisen 
periodically, most recently in the attempts to admit the “State of Palestine” to the UN in 2011 
and 2012. The impact of the admission to the UNon the Palestinian refugees and their rights was 
part of the debate on the effectiveness of this initiative and its potential shortcomings.20  
                                                 
13
 Zilbershats, supra note 3 at 202. 
14
 Zilbershats quotes Kathleen Lawand to demonstrate that the effective link between the Palestinian refugees and 
Israel has weakened because of the long period of time that has elapsed since displacement. She neglects to deal 
with the argument by Lawand that the lapse of time must take into account “the reasons for the non-exercise of 
return during the said period”. See Lawand, supra note 2 at 556. 
15
 Nottebohm Case (second phase) (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4 [Nottebohm]. 
16
 Lawand, supra  note 2 at 557. 
17
 Charles E. Stewart v. Canada , Human Rights Committee Communication No. 538/1993, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/1993 (1996) [Stewart v. Canada]. 
18
 Quigley, supra  note 2 at 216. Takkenberg asserts that Palestinian refugees in Jordan are no longer considered 
refugees under the 1951 Convention, but they are still eligible to exercise the right to return. However, he does not 
provide a detailed explanation as to why this is so. See Takkenberg, supra  note 4 at 128. 
19
 Quigley, ibid., at 217. 
20
 See e.g. Susan AKRAM, “The Palestinian Statehood Strategy in the United Nations: Lesson from Namibia” 
Jadaliyya  (3 October 2011), online: Jadaliyya <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2797/the-palestinian-
statehood-strategy-in-the-united-n>; Guy GOODWIN-GILL, “Opinion Re The Palestine Liberation Organization, 
the Future State of Palestine, and the Question of Popular Representation” Jadaliyya (31 August 2011), online: 
Jadaliyya <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2530/guy-s.-goodwin-gill-legal-opinion-on-palestinian-s>; Mutaz 
M. QAFISHEH, “Bases for the Palestinian Refugees’ Right of Return under International Law: Beyond General 
Assembly Resolution 194” Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law Blog (26 November 2012), 
online: CJICL <http://cjicl.org.uk/2012/11/26/bases-for-the-palestinian-refugees-right-of-return-under-international-
law-beyond-general-assembly-resolution-194-2/>.  
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The article will examine the different sources of the right of return, and will focus on 
international human rights law, mainly Article 12(4) of the ICCPR, the general comments of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, and other applicable instruments. It will examine if 
there is a conflict between international refugee law and the ICCPR on this issue, and if there is 
one, a possible way to reconcile the conflict. The article will argue that the establishment of a 
new home country or the acquisition of a new citizenship does not nullify the right of return. It 
will provide a conceptual basis for this argument in relation to Palestinian refugees, and at the 
same time elucidate the relationship between international refugee law and general international 
human rights law. The issues dealt with in this article may be relevant to other refugee situations 
such as the Nepali-speaking refugees from Bhutan.21  
Part I of the paper will begin with a brief discussion of the right of refugees to return to their 
country of origin and the different sources of law on which this right could be based. This part 
will focus on the right of return under international human rights law, in particular, Article 12(4) 
of the ICCPR because it appears to be the strongest and the least disputed source of this right. 
The concept of “one’s own country” in Article 12(4) will be examined in Part II. Part III will 
focus on the 1951 Convention, its applicability and relevance to the Palestinian refugees, and the 
meaning and implications of the cessation of refugee status. Finally, Part IV will sum up the 
discussion and provide a model that would cohere with international human rights law. 
 
I. THE SOURCES OF THE RIGHT OF RETURN 
 
A. The Right of Return Under International Law 
 
The right of an individual to return to her country is part of the broader concept of freedom of 
movement. Freedom of movement encompasses a broad range of human rights that include the 
right to leave or enter a state, and the right to reside in a state. It is seen as “an indispensable 
condition for the free development of a person”.22 Under international law, the right is based on a 
number of sources. A number of scholars have asserted that the right of return, of refugees 
especially, has attained the status of customary international law,23 and as such applies to the 
Palestinian refugees. In this context, General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)24 is widely seen as 
                                                 
21
 Tang Lay LEE, “Refugees from Bhutan: Nationality, Statelessness and the Right to Return” (1998) 10 
International Journal of Refugee Law 118. See also Bill FRELICK, “For Bhutan’s Refugees, There’s No Place like 
Home” Human Rights Watch (30 March 2011), online: Human Rights Watch 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/30/bhutan-s-refugees-there-s-no-place-home>.  
22
 General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement (Art. 12), UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C221/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999) [General Comment]. 
23
 Eric ROSAND, “The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia 
Precedent?” (1997) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 1121; Vic ULLOM, “Voluntary Repatriation of 
Refugees and Customary International Law” (2001) 29 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 115; Alfred 
de ZAYAS, “The Illegality of Population Transfers and the Application of Emerging International Norms in the 
Palestinian Context” (1990) 6 Palestinian Yearbook of International Law 17 at 34. 
24
 Paragraph 11 of the Palestine-Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator , GA Res. 194 (III), UN Doc. 
A/RES/194(III) (1948) [GA Res. 194 (III)], which concerned the war situation in Palestine in 1948, provides that the 
General Assembly:  
resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be 
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of 
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an affirmation of the existence of the right under customary international law.25 Proponents of 
this view point to state practice as support for their position.26 They also point to the fact that this 
right is expressly recognized in international human right instruments, state constitutions and 
local legislation, international humanitarian law, and resolutions of the UN organs.27 
The flight of the Palestinian refugees occurred during an armed conflict. It was primarily the 
result of active expulsion by the Israeli army in what can be seen as population transfer or ethnic 
cleansing.28 International humanitarian law, therefore, could be one of the sources for the right of 
return.29 The main source for the right of return under humanitarian law is the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Article 45 of the 
Convention regulates the temporary transfer of protected persons, and requires their repatriation. 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits “individual or mass transfer” of 
protected persons from an occupied territory to another territory or country. Article 49 also 
requires the repatriation of displaced persons “as soon as the hostilities in the area in question 
have ceased”.30  
International law recognizes the obligation of states to readmit their nationals. This rule is 
known as the “readmission rule”. States are under the obligation to allow their nationals to return 
to their territory so that they would not impose a burden on other states hosting them. This 
obligation is not, however, owed to nationals or refugees. It is invoked in the context of relations 
between states, and the obligations states owe each other.31 Accordingly, states cannot prohibit 
the readmission of their nationals by denationalizing them.32 Several commentators have asserted 
that according to the law of state succession, and given their habitual residence in the territory 
which became Israel in 1948, Palestinian refugees had ipso facto acquired the nationality of 
                                                                                                                                                             
those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international 
law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. 
25
 Mallison and Mallison, supra  note 2 at 28; Lawand, supra  note 2 at 544; Bowling, supra  note 2 at 15.  
26
 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) statistics show that between the 
years 1997 and 2006, about 11.6 million refugees were able to return home. These include 5.4 million Afghan 
refugees and 1 million refugees from Serbia and Montenegro. In the same period, 683,000 refugees returned to 
Liberia, 529,000 returned to Angola, 504,000 returned to Burundi, and 469,000 returned to Sierra Leone. In 2006 
alone, an estimated 734,000 refugees were repatriated to their countries of origin. In contrast, during 1997-2006, 
approximately 838,000 refugees were accepted for resettlement programs in third countries. See UNHCR, “UNHCR 
Statistical Yearbook 2006: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions” (December 2007), online: UNHCR  
<http://www.unhcr.org/478cda572.html> at 36-8. In other words, for every refugee who had been settled during that 
period, 14 refugees were repatriated. These figures reflect an overwhelming preference for return as a durable 
solution to the refugee problem, so much so that the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ms. Sadako Ogata 
declared the period beginning in 1992 as the “decade of voluntary repatriation”. See UNHCR, “Introductory 
Statement by Ms. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the Informal Meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (ExCom)” (26 June 1992), online: UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3ae68fae1c&query=decade%20of%20repatriation>.) 
27
 Lawand, supra  note 2 at 544. 
28
 See Pappe, supra  note 1.  
29
 See Quigley, supra  note 2 at 197. For a different opinion, see Rex J. ZEDALIS, “Right to Return: A Closer Look” 
(1992) 6 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 499. 
30
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 (entered into force 21 October 1950). 
31
 Paul WEIS, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Alphen aan den rijn: Sitjthoff & Noordhoff 
International Publishers, 1979) at 45. 
32
 Ibid., at 54.      
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Israel as a successor state.33 Their en masse denationalization in 1952 is, thus, a breach of 
international law, and Israel has an obligation, which is owed to its neighbouring states, to 
readmit the Palestinian refugees.34   
International human rights law is the most explicit and elaborate source for the right of return. 
Human rights law instruments—which include conventions, general comments of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, the decisions of the committee in the communications submitted to it, 
and decisions by human rights courts and tribunals—delineate the content and contours of this 
right in a more detailed manner than other areas of law. This allows for a deeper and more 
focused analysis of the right, as opposed to the existence of the right as a broad concept or a 
general principle in other sources. 
A number of human rights law instruments contain a provision that protects the right to return 
to, or to enter and remain in, the state of origin. The most important of these instruments are the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),35 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.36 
Regional human rights conventions, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also recognize a right to return.37 
Article 13(2) of the UDHR provides that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country”. Article 12(4) of the ICCPR provides that “[n]o 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”. Although both provisions 
essentially deal with the same right, the provisions in both instruments are phrased somewhat 
differently. The former grants a right to “return”, while the latter grants a right to “enter”. The 
former states that the place where the individual should be allowed to return to is “his country”, 
while the latter uses the phrase “one’s own country”. These differences are not significant, and it 
is clear from the travaux préparatoires that by using the term “enter” and the phrase “one’s own 
country”, the drafters of the ICCPR had intended to broaden the scope of the right as compared 
to the right in the UDHR.38 
                                                 
33
 Kattan, supra  note 2 at 90-2; Quigley, supra  note 2 at 194. 
34
 The denationalization was the outcome of the enactment of the Citizenship Act-1952 by the Israeli Parliament. 
According to this Act, the acquisition of citizenship by the non-Jewish residents of Israel was subject to proving 
uninterrupted residency from the day of the creation of the state in 1948 until 1952. This effectively meant that all 
refugees (and many Palestinians who were not refugees but who could not prove residency) were not entitled to 
citizenship. See supra  note 7.   
35
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948), Art. 13. 
36
 ICCPR, supra  note 12, Art. 12; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969), Art. 5(d)(ii), which Israel 
signed on 7 March 1966 and ratified on 3 January 1979. 
37
 Art. 22(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into 
force 18 July 1978); Art. 12(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 
217 (entered into force 21 October 1986); Art. 3(2) of Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16 September 1963, Eur.T.S. 46 (entered into force 2 May 1968).  
38
 See Hurst HANNUM, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice (Dordrect: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publisher, 1987) at 59. The Commission on Human Rights, in its 5th, 6th, and 8th sessions discussed the 
drafting of Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR, especially the issue of which terms to use—“return” or “enter”, and “country of  
which he is a national” or “one’s own country”. It decided to adopt the term “enter” because “[the ICCPR] was 
intended to cover cases such as those persons born abroad who had never been to the country of their nationality”. 
The phrase “one’s own country” was adopted because the phrase “country of which he is a national” would not 
require states to grant the right of entry to individuals, who had established their home there even though they were 
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As opposed to the UDHR, which is non-binding and declaratory in nature, and which was 
adopted as a UN General Assembly Resolution,39 the ICCPR is a treaty that was signed and 
ratified by most states in the world,40 and is, therefore, binding on those state parties.41 The 
ICCPR, which was adopted in 1966, is a more recent source of law than the UDHR, which was 
adopted in 1948. Article 12(4) of the ICCPR deals with the right to enter one’s own country. The 
right to return could be derived from the right to enter the country, since denying the entry or re-
entry is the main barrier to return. It is arguable that if a refugee had only one nationality, even if 
she was stripped of her nationality, she would still have one place where she can call her “own 
country”, which she should be allowed to enter. The acquisition of a new nationality creates a 
situation where there is another country that a refugee can call her “own country”. The question 
then becomes whether the acquisition of a new nationality extinguishes the right to enter and 
return to the country of origin? This question will be discussed in Part II. 
 
B. A Note on the Time Frame and Relation to Applicable Law 
 
Due to the long period of time since the flight of the Palestinian refugees in 1948, one of the 
issues that should be addressed at the outset is the question of the effect of time in relation to the 
law. Two relevant issues should be explored. The first is the temporal applicability of 
international legal norms: what legal rules or principles apply to the situation of the Palestinian 
refugees, bearing in mind that the displacement took place in 1948? Here, I will briefly discuss 
the rule of intertemporal law and the different views on the state of the law at the relevant time. 
Second, I will address the issue of the descendants of the refugees, who were expelled in 1947-
1949, who are now second or third-generation refugees.  
The main source articulating the rule of intertemporal law is the arbitral award in the Island of 
Palmas Arbitration.42 Here, Judge Max Huber stated that “a juridical fact must be appreciated in 
the light of the law contemporary with it”.43 Judge Huber then added what is known as the 
second branch of the rule of intertemporal law, that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
not nationals.  See Marc J. BOSSUYT, Guide to the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Dordrect: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) at 261. 
39
 Nevertheless, it is widely accepted now that the right of return under the UDHR is customary international law.  
See Memorial of the United States, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. 
Iran), [1980] I.C.J. Pleadings 182; Theodore MERON, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Ullom, supra  note 23. Other commentators, however, are of the view that there is 
no sufficient consensus on this point to draw conclusions. See Hurst HANNUM, “The Status of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law” (1995-1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 346. 
40
 The ICCPR was signed by 167 states, and ratified by 160 states. The number of states that are members of the UN 
is 192. Israel signed the ICCPR on 19 December 1966 and ratified it on 3 October 1991. 
41
 According to Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980), if the rules set forth in a treaty are recognized as customary rules of 
international law, these rules become binding upon a third state. 
42
 Island of Palmas Arbitration (United States v. The Netherlands), Award of 4 April 1928, [1928] II Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards 829. 
43
 Ibid., at 845. 
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[t]he same principle which subjects the acts creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, 
demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions 
required by the evolution of law.44 
  
In the context of the Palestinian refugees and their right of return, Victor Kattan provides an 
elaborate analysis of the temporal issue.45 He argues that in 1947-1949, international law norms 
banned deportations, in addition to a number of practices that triggered the flight of the 
Palestinian refugees, such as murder, massacre, rape, pillage, and destruction of property. This, 
he argues, rendered the expulsions and the acts that caused the flight of the refugees a breach of 
international law obligations under international law as it was then. Kattan supports his position 
by reviewing the jurisprudence of the military tribunals in the aftermath of the World War II, 
including the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals.46 Kattan draws more support for his position 
by quoting a report prepared by the British Foreign Office regarding the 1948 war, which found 
that customary international law did apply to that war. This included the norms found in various 
conventions on international humanitarian law, even though Israel was not a party to them since 
most of the rules and principles enshrined in them reflected existing customary international 
law.47 Given that the expulsion and the other associated atrocities were illegal at the time they 
were committed, he argues that Israel committed further violations by the subsequent acts of 
property confiscation, denationalization, and banning refugees from returning using violence and 
other legislative tools, and, therefore, Israel’s actions amounted to a continuous wrongful act. 
According to the second branch of the intertemporal law rule, the relevant law that applies when 
the conflict is resolved is the law as it developed since the violation first occurred. This means 
that the sources mentioned earlier in this part are all relevant even though some of them came 
into force after the displacement. Kattan also draws further support for his position from Article 
14 of the International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. Sub section 2 of this Article deals specifically with breaches of international 
obligations that have a “continuing character”, and states that such acts are considered breaches 
“for the entire period during which the act continues and remains not in conformity with the 
international obligation.”48 Kattan’s position is also supported by state practice in the aftermath 
of World War II when the majority of the displaced persons were repatriated, some even 
forcibly.49 
Contrary to Kattan’s position, Andrew Kent argues that Palestinian refugees are not entitled to 
return because, amongst other reasons, the initial expulsion of 1947-1949 was not illegal.50 Kent 
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 Ibid. 
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 Victor KATTAN, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab Israeli Conflict 
(London: Pluto Press, 2009) at 212-7. 
46
 Ibid., at 203-8. 
47
 Ibid., at 204.  
48
 Ibid., at 213. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Adopted by the International 
Law Commission at its 53rd session on 3 August 2001, Annex to GA Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001). 
49
 Daniel COHEN, “Between Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Occupied Germany 1945-1946” 
(2008) 43 Journal of Contemporary History 437.  
50
 Kent, supra note 3. In a long article, Kent argues that none of the sources discussed earlier do apply to Palestinian 
refugees. Here I will only focus on his approach to intertemporal law.  
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argues that the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 did not apply to the war in 1948.51 He 
further argues that even if Israel was bound by the norms found in the Hague Conventions as part 
of customary international law, none of the relevant provisions were applicable in the 
circumstances.52 The Hague Conventions, Kent argues, did not apply because the Israeli army, 
and the pre-state military groups, could not be seen as a hostile occupying army, as per the 
language used in the conventions.53 He also adds that the territories from which the refugees 
were expelled were not part of another hostile state that exercised legitimate authority in the 
area.54  
There are strong reasons to prefer Kattan’s position to Kent’s. Kent’s arguments suffer from a 
number of flaws. His reasoning regarding the applicability of customary international law on the 
laws of armed conflict is very highly formalistic that tries to avoid the substantive legal 
principles and norms by resorting to a high level of technicality and narrow interpretation. His 
reasoning is contrary to the spirit of the norms and the texts they are enshrined in, and the 
manner in which they were applied as early as the 1940s. If taken to their logical conclusion, 
Kent’s arguments in effect mean that none of the norms, rules, conventions, or legal principles 
that govern armed conflict applied to the situation in Palestine in 1947-1948, with the result that 
Palestine was in some sort of legal vacuum. This was contrary to the reality at the time. Since the 
second decade of the twentieth century, there has been significant international interest in the 
legal status of Palestine, and Palestine has been the subject of numerous debates relating to 
international law, especially in the 1940s. Kent’s discussion of whether the expulsions of the 
1948 amounted to crimes against humanity is equally not compelling.  
There are other grounds to prefer Kattan’s position. The discussion here is focused on the 
issue of human rights. Many human rights violations, as in the case of expulsion and prohibiting 
return, are “continuing acts”. Various human rights bodies and courts have noted that 
international human rights instruments should be interpreted as “living instruments”, with 
flexible application of the intertemporal law rule. These bodies, which include the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee,55 have asserted jurisdiction over, and 
adjudicated upon violations that took place prior to the entry into force of various human treaties. 
This was based on the determination that these violations were “continuing acts” which extended 
over the whole period of time they continued to be in violation of international norms. This has 
led some scholars to conclude that in the case of human rights violations, the first branch of the 
intertemporal principle does not apply, or at least does not apply strictly.56   
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The issue of time also arises in the case of the descendants of the first generation of refugees 
who were not born in the country of origin, in this case Palestine, or, after 1948, Israel. In the 
context of their right to return, Article 12(4) of the ICCPR uses the term “enter”, which is 
broader than “return”. The commentary by the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
provides that the right to enter one’s own country “may also entitle a person to come to the 
country for the first time if he or she was born outside the country (for example, if that country is 
the person’s State of nationality)”.57 This understanding is also supported by the travaux 
préparatoires of the ICCPR.58 This position is also supported by the fact that the nationality 
legislation that was valid in pre-1948 Mandate Palestine, and the Israeli Citizenship Law-1952 
are based on the notion of jus sanguinis (nationality based upon the nationality of the parents). 
Since the denationalization of the Palestinian refugees was illegal under international law, one 
could argue that the right to return of their descendants is not extinguished by the fact that they 
were born abroad, and by the fact that they had never set foot in the country. While the passage 
of time and the fact that they were not born in the country makes their link weaker than the first-
generation refugees, the descendants have maintained strong ties to the area of historic Palestine 
as will be explained later in Part III. 
 
II. THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE “ONE’S OWN COUNTRY” 
 
The phrase “one’s own country” was discussed by the UN Human Rights Committee.59 The 
General Comment states that the phrase “one’s own country” is broader than the concept of “the 
country of nationality”, and it is not limited to nationality in a formal sense. The Committee 
states: 
 
It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral; it 
embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a 
given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. This would be the case, for example, of nationals of a 
country who have there been stripped of their nationality in violation of international law, and of individuals 
whose country of nationality has been incorporated in or transferred to another national entity, whose 
nationality is being denied them. The language of article 12, paragraph 4, moreover, permits a broader 
interpretation that might embrace other categories of long-term residents, including but not limited to 
stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence. 
Since other factors may in certain circumstances result in the establishment of close and enduring 
connections between a person and a country, States parties should include in their reports information on the 
rights of permanent residents to return to their country of residence.60 
 
The General Comment does not explicitly address the consequences of the acquisition of a 
new nationality on entering the country of origin, but its special emphasis on special ties or 
relations to the country does provide some useful insights. The phrase “one’s own country” was 
examined in The Charles Stewart v. Canada Communication, and the Oppenheim and Nottebohm 
cases, which will be discussed below.  
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A. The Charles E. Stewart v. Canada Communication 
 
The main case that precipitated the General Comment is the decision of the Human Rights 
Committee in the Charles E. Stewart v. Canada  communication.61 In this decision, the 
Committee decided that the term “one’s own country” is broader than the concept of “the 
country of nationality” and is not limited to nationality in a formal sense. The communication 
dealt with a situation in which Canada had decided to deport an immigrant, Stewart—a British 
national—who lived most of his life in Canada but did not acquire Canadian citizenship, even 
though there were no impediments to acquiring nationality by immigrants. The Committee 
decided that Canada could not be seen as “his own country” since Stewart did not apply for 
formal citizenship, although he was entitled to do so. The Committee, thus, focused on the fact 
that he opted not to apply for citizenship. The Committee, however, did not mention the fact that 
he was holding citizenship in another country as grounds for denying him the right to enter 
Canada.62 The Committee stated that:  
 
The question in the present case is whether a person who enters a given State under that State’s immigration 
laws, and subject to the conditions of those laws, can regard the state as his own country when he has not 
acquired its nationality and continues to retain the nationality of his country of origin. The answer could 
possibly be positive were the country of immigration to place unreasonable impediments on the acquiring of 
nationality by new immigrants. But when, as in the present case, the country of immigration facilitates 
acquiring its nationality, and the immigrant refrains from doing so, either by choice or by committing acts 
that will disqualify him from acquiring that nationality, the country of immigration does not become “his 
own country” within the meaning of article 12, paragraph 4 of the Covenant.63 
 
One could infer from the Committee’s statement that an immigrant could possibly regard her 
country of immigration as “her own country” if she was denied citizenship by unreasonable 
impediments, regardless of the fact that she still holds another citizenship. One could argue that 
if special ties and relations to a country are proven, the emphasis would shift to the actions of the 
individual when given the chance to strengthen her relations to “her own country”. This means 
that in order to examine the right of return under the ICCPR, three main factors should be 
examined. First is the presence of special ties to the country one claims to have the right to return 
to. The second factor, if special ties exist, is the choices that were available to the individual. 
That is, if the state had given her the choice of, or facilitated the strengthening of the special ties 
and relations. The third factor concerns the decisions and actions of the individual in light of the 
choices she was given.  
It is argued that a similar rule should be applied to refugees. Refugees who had to flee from 
their countries and who were arbitrarily denied any chance of returning or re-acquiring their 
nationality still maintain special ties and claims to their country of origin. The emphasis should, 
therefore, be on the decisions they made on the basis of the choices that were available to them. 
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Could the acquisition of a new nationality in the case of refugees be seen as a choice not to 
“strengthen the special ties and relations”? This should be examined in view of the options that 
were available for them. If the refugee is likely to face the same risk of persecution, which had 
engendered their initial flight, it cannot be argued that the refugee has the option of returning. 
Indeed, in such a situation, if return is not voluntary in nature, it would be seen as a breach of 
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugees Convention which prohibits expulsion or return of a refugee to 
areas where her life or freedom are at risk.  For example, in a case of a refugee whose country of 
origin is still in a state of war, a meaningful option of returning is denied. In such a case, it 
cannot be argued that this refugee has opted not to strengthen her relations with her state of 
origin, since this option does not exist in the first place. Another situation is when the reason of 
the flight does not exist anymore, but the government in control of the country of origin is 
preventing the return of the refugees, as in the case of the Palestinian refugees and the Nepali-
speaking refugees from Bhutan. In such an instance, the option for the individual to strengthen 
the ties with the country does not exist, and, therefore, the acquisition of a new nationality should 
not affect her rights to enter her country of origin even if she has lost her formal nationality of 
that country. 
 
B. The Oppenheim Case 
 
The notion of personal choice in view of the options available to an individual seeking return to 
her own country is also supported by another decision. In the Oppenheim Case,64 the UK House 
of Lords, in its application of international law principles and the provisions of German 
legislation on nationality, decided that an illegal deprivation of nationality may become 
irreversible if the individual voluntarily establishes herself elsewhere at a point when the 
resumption of the original citizenship would have been possible. Meier Oppenheim, a German-
born Jew who had fled to the United Kingdom in 1939, was deprived of his German nationality 
by a decree from 1941. Given the racist nature of the decree, which was to denationalize only 
German Jews, the decree was seen as illegal under international law. Oppenheim was 
subsequently naturalized in Britain. In 1949, as a result of a new provision in German nationality 
legislation, he was able to reclaim his nationality but opted not to do so. The case dealt with the 
question of whether Oppenheim was liable to pay United Kingdom income tax on certain 
pension payments, which he had received when he was a British national. According to a tax 
convention between the German Federal Republic and the United Kingdom, such payments 
would be exempted from tax if Oppenheim were a German national.  
Although the deprivation of nationality was illegal under international law, the fact that 
Oppenheim chose not to reclaim his nationality rendered this illegal act irreversible. In this case, 
the decisions and the acts of the individual were taken into consideration, in light of the choices 
that the individual had. The case emphasizes the possibility of the resumption of the individual’s 
original citizenship. It would be reasonable to argue that without the ability to resume the 
individual’s nationality, the illegal denationalization would be seen as void, and the individual 
would still be seen as a national of her state of origin, even if she has subsequently acquired a 
new citizenship. Brownlie, for example, states that “an illegal deprivation of nationality (for 
example on a racial basis) may become irreversible if the individual voluntarily establishes 
herself elsewhere at a stage when ‘resumption’ of the original citizenship would have been 
                                                 
64
 Oppenheim v. Cattermole [1975] 2 W.L.R. 347 (H.L.). 
14 
 
A version of this article has been accepted for publication by the Asian Journal of International  
Law, and will appear in a revised form subsequent to editorial input.  ©  Mazen Masri,  2014 
possible”.65 This means that as long as the resumption of the original citizenship is not possible, 
the irreversibility of the deprivation of nationality, and in turn the rights that nationality entails, 
is questionable. Once again, the individual’s actions in light of the options she has are the main 
points of focus in the analysis. 
 
C. The Nottebohm Case and the “Effective Link Theory” 
 
Another area, which may assist in the determination of the scope of “one’s own country”, is 
nationality as understood and interpreted in the context of diplomatic protection. States may only 
exercise diplomatic protection in respect of their nationals. This highlights the importance of 
ascertaining the nationality of individuals before states exercise diplomatic protection. Here, 
issues similar to the one we are dealing with have arisen, namely, where it is not clear what 
nationality an individual has, or in situations where the individual has dual nationality and there 
is a need to ascertain which nationality would apply for the purpose of diplomatic protection. 
The authoritative decision of Nottebohm relied on the “effective link theory”.66 Subsequent 
decisions on nationality have relied heavily on the “effective link theory”, making this theory a 
general norm of international law.67 
Friedrich Nottebohm was German by birth. He settled in Guatemala for 34 years where he 
owned a business enterprise. In 1939, he applied for naturalization in Liechtenstein and was 
granted citizenship. In 1943, he was removed from Guatemala, and subsequently his assets and 
business were expropriated because he was seen as a national of an enemy state—Germany. In 
the case brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Liechtenstein, Liechtenstein 
claimed damages in respect of acts against Nottebohm, who bore its citizenship. Guatemala 
argued that the case was inadmissible on a number of grounds, including the claim that 
Nottebohm appeared to have solicited Liechtenstein nationality fraudulently, and with the sole 
object of acquiring a nationality of a state, which was neutral in World War II, and without 
having any intention to establish a genuine link to the country. 
The ICJ decided that there was no bond of attachment between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein. 
The Court explained that nationality is: 
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the 
juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as 
the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State 
conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to 
exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual's 
connection with the State which has made him its national.68 
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Based on the existence of a “genuine” and “effective” link, the ICJ stated that preference should 
be given to the “real and effective” nationality. On the question of what is the individual’s “real” 
nationality, the ICJ answered: 
the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties 
between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken 
into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitua1 residence of the 
individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his 
family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his 
children, etc.69 
 
The ICJ found that Nottebohm had no bond or attachment to Leichtenstein because his 
naturalization there was for the sole purpose of “coming within the protection of Liechtenstein 
but not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life”.70 On the other hand, 
the ICJ concluded that he had a long-standing connection with Guatemala although he did not 
carry its nationality, a connection which was not weakened by naturalization elsewhere. On an 
overall assessment of the case, and the principles that the case applies, it is safe to conclude that 
the focus for the determination of nationality is on the individual’s “genuine” connection. The 
genuineness of the connection does not necessarily mean nationality in the formal sense, but is 
assessed according to the quality and significance of the individual’s links to a given country. 
When naturalization—which is essentially the acquisition of citizenship—is involved, the ICJ 
placed special emphasis on the purpose and circumstances of the naturalization. Naturalization is 
not seen as evidence of the relinquishment of links with other countries that individuals have 
strong links with. 
If such principles were adopted in the case of ascertaining nationality for the purpose of 
providing diplomatic protection, similar principles can arguably be used in order to ascertain the 
individual’s “own country” according to the ICCPR, since both cases rely on the connection 
between the individual and the country. Yet, such adoption of principles and rules should be 
done with caution. The determination of nationality for the sake of diplomatic protection should 
not be the same in international human rights law. Diplomatic protection falls within the realm of 
relations between states: the determination of nationality is in order to determine whether a state 
has the right to protect the individual, for example, by representing her in a legal action in an 
international forum, or by bestowing diplomatic immunity. On the other hand, the determination 
of nationality, or “one’s own country” in international human rights law, falls within the realm of 
relations between the individual and the state. States are treated as equals in their relations with 
each other; yet in the relations between the individual and the state, the balance of power always 
leans towards the state, and, hence, the need for human rights protection for the individual. Any 
analogy with other areas of law should be done with this asymmetry in mind, and in order to 
strengthen the protection of the individual’s human rights. In accomplishing this, the broad 
principle of “real or genuine link” can be adopted more generally.  
 
D. “One’s Own Country” and the Palestinian Refugees 
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This part of the article has thus far demonstrated that the notion of “one’s own country”, or even 
nationality, at least in the context of the ICCPR, is not limited to the formal sense, but is built on 
the link between the individual and the territory, and the nature of this link. Emphasis is placed 
on the strength of the link, the ability to strengthen this link, and on the decisions that the 
individuals has made, given the options they had. How do these conclusions apply to the issue of 
the Palestinian refugees, who were displaced in 1948 from Palestine, which no longer exists as a 
legal entity? In 1948, the new state of Israel was formed, and with the end of the war in 1949, 
Israel controlled all of the areas the refugees were expelled from, which became Israeli sovereign 
territory. This begs the question: what is the “country of origin” of these refugees? 
A number of observations will be helpful in determining the “country of origin”. While 
Palestine as a legal entity under the mandate no longer exists, the geographical area or “the 
country”—present-day Israel—still exists. In this regard, international law on state succession,71 
the Mandate nationality legislation in Palestine which was repealed only in 1952,72 and to some 
extent, some Israeli authorities up to the enactment of the 1952 Citizenship Act73 support the 
assertion that these refugees should be entitled to Israeli citizenship. Even under Israeli law, the 
idea of “return” does exist and is enshrined in the Law of Return-1950, and does not require any 
strong links to the country but merely belonging to the Jewish faith.74 The idea of return is even a 
major constitutional principle.75 In this sense, the Palestinian refugees still have a strong link to 
the country which is now Israel, as the successor state of Mandate Palestine, which they see as 
their “own country”. Despite the long period of time since their displacement, most of them, 
even those who had been naturalized in host countries, still see themselves as Palestinian and 
many still hope to return to their country of origin. Even though many changes have taken place 
since 1948, and the social, political, and economic situations today differ considerably from the 
situation in Palestine of 1948, this does not mean that the refugees today do not have links to the 
country of Israel. Most of them still hold ownership deeds over the land that they were expelled 
from. Some even still have the keys to their houses they left in 1948. Most of them still identify 
with the town or village they or their parents used to live in, and many of them have family 
members from whom they were separated in 1948. The attachment to Palestine as a geographical 
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area that Palestinians see as their homeland, which is now under Israeli sovereignty, has played 
an important role in the shaping and development of the Palestinian national identity.76  
On the other hand, some commentators, such as Yaffa Zilbershatz, have argued that any link 
that the Palestinian refugees have with Israel is artificial and is superseded by links to the 
countries they reside in.77 This argument, however, ignores the fact the about twenty per cent of 
the population of Israel are Palestinian, many of whom still maintain strong links with the 
Palestinian refugees, many of whom belong to the same families. It also ignores the fact that the 
links were weakened due to Israeli official policies and decisions and not because of choices that 
the refugees made. So far, Israel has been categorically denying the refugees the right to return to 
their country,78 and, therefore, they cannot be seen as having the ability to strengthen their links 
with their country, which is now Israel.  
It is important here to recall that the expulsion and the denial of return were part of a racially-
motivated policy that translated into acts of expulsion and legislative measures to block the 
return of the refugees in order to maintain a strong Jewish majority in Israel. This goal of a 
Jewish majority could not have been possible without widespread expulsions, especially since at 
the time the UN had recommended the partition of Palestine in late 1947, there were more 
Palestinian Arabs than Jews in the area designated as the Jewish state.79 After the displacement, 
Israel enacted laws in order to freeze the demographic situation at the time, which reduced the 
Palestinians to a minority of 13%. These included the Absentee Property Act-1950, which 
confiscated all of the property of the refugees; the Citizenship Act 1952, which officially 
denationalised all of the Palestinian refugees (even those who were internally displaced); and the 
Prohibition of Infiltration Ordinance-1954, which was meant to facilitate the expulsion of those 
refugees who had managed to make their way back to their homes.80 This policy was 
accompanied by discriminatory policies in almost all areas of life against the Palestinian 
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minority in Israel. Many of these policies still persist today and even intensified in some areas.81 
For example, in 2003, Israel enacted the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Act (temporary law)-
2003, which effectively makes family reunification between Palestinians, who are Israeli 
citizens, and other Palestinians almost impossible.82 The idea of creating and maintaining a 
Jewish majority is one of the main manifestations of Israel’s definition as a Jewish state, and it is 
seen as one of the cornerstones of the constitutional edifice.83 The policy has a strong racial 
emphasis, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has found policies of a 
similar nature to be a violation of international law. The Committee emphasized that “any 
attempt to change or to uphold a changed demographic composition of an area against the will of 
the original inhabitants, by whatever means, is a violation of international law”.84 
After Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, it extended its racial policies 
to these areas. Although the occupation was not accompanied with large-scale expulsions as in 
1948, many people left the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and were denied return.85 Israel also 
embarked on a large-scale colonization process by settling its population in Jewish settlements in 
breach of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The settlements and the wall that was 
constructed to protect them led to further waves of displacement.86 In 2004, the ICJ issued its 
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory declaring the wall and the settlements illegal, and added that they violated 
the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.87 This strong emphasis on the racial aspects of 
Israel’s policy has led some scholars to argue that the situation should be more accurately 
described as apartheid.88 Given the policy of racial discrimination, the demographic policies, the 
ongoing and even increasing violations, and the obstacles that Israel has mounted in the way of 
those who want to return, the refugees’ naturalization in the country of refuge or in a third 
country does not, absent the existence of the option to return to Israel, nullify their right of 
return. 
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It is important here to highlight that despite the fact that issues of migration and nationality 
are matters of local law, they are still governed by principles of international law.89 Israel cannot 
rely on its internal legislation, and even its constitutional basic laws that emphasize the idea of 
the Jewish state in order to evade its obligations under international law.90 In any event, these 
issues are not expected to be addressed in any local Israeli court; instead, they are expected to be 
discussed in negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the 
political representative of the refugees, and they, therefore, have to be decided in accordance 
with international law. Indeed, according to the Oslo agreement, the question of the refugees is 
one of the issues to be discussed in the “permanent status” negotiations.91  
In this context, it is worthwhile noting the circumstances under which some Palestinian 
refugees had acquired a new citizenship. As a result of the displacement of 1948, Palestinian 
refugees fled mainly to neighbouring countries, such as Jordan (which after the war included the 
area known as the West Bank of the Jordan River, which in 1967 was occupied by Israel), Syria, 
Lebanon, Egypt (including the Gaza Strip which was under Egyptian occupation), and Iraq. Out 
of these countries, only Jordan granted citizenship to the Palestinians who resided in the 
Kingdom after the 1948 war. This category included refugees (who fled to Jordan and the West 
Bank) and non-refugees (residents of the West Bank).92 In 1988, Jordan renounced its claim for 
sovereignty over the West Bank and severed its legal and administrative links with it, and as a 
result, Palestinians residing there lost their Jordanian citizenship, and Palestinian refugees 
residing in Jordan were able to maintain their Jordanian citizenship.93 This is the biggest 
category of Palestinian refugees who now hold citizenship of a third state, and they number 
about 1.75 million.94 Another significant group of Palestinian refugees who were given 
citizenship were wealthy Christian Palestinians in Lebanon. The Lebanese Government gave 
them citizenship in the 1950s in an attempt to maintain the demographic balance between 
Christians and Muslims in the country.95 In the other host countries mentioned above and other 
countries that some Palestinian refugees have immigrated to or sought asylum in—mainly 
Europe, North American, and Australia—the grant of citizenship was done on an individual basis 
as part of the naturalization process.96 
 
                                                 
89
 Weis, supra note 31 at 88. 
90
 Ibid.; see also Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, [1988] I.C.J. Rep. 12. 
91
 Article XVII (1)(a) of the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank & Gaza Strip, 28 September 
1995, online: UNSCO <http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Key/Israeli-
Palestinian%20Interim%20Agreement%20on%20the%20West%20Bank%20and%20the%20Gaza%20Strip.pdf >.  
92
 Article 3 of the Jordanian Nationality Law (1954), Official Gazette no. 1171, p.105 (16.2.1954). See Takkenberg, 
supra note 4 at 155. 
93
 Takkenberg, supra note 4 at 156; Asem KHALIL, “Palestinian Refugees in Arab States: A Rights Based 
Approach”, CARIM Research Reports (Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International 
Migration), 2008-2009, 22, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523510>.  
94
 The total number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency is 
about 1.98 million. See UNRWA, “In Figures as of 1 January 2012” (January 2012), online: UNRWA 
<http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/20120317152850.pdf>. Out of this number, one should deduct about 150,000 to 
account for Palestinian refugees who came to Jordan from the Gaza Strip after the 1967 war. These refugees were 
not granted Jordanian citizenship. See Khalil, ibid., at 23. 
95
 Takkenberg, supra note 4 at 164. 
96
 Khalil, supra note 93 at 19-28; Takkenberg, supra note 4 at 149-91. 
20 
 
A version of this article has been accepted for publication by the Asian Journal of International  
Law, and will appear in a revised form subsequent to editorial input.  ©  Mazen Masri,  2014 
III. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE CESSATION OF THE REFUGEE 
STATUS 
 
This part of the article will deal with the impact of the cessation of refugee status on the right of 
return of Palestinian refugees. It will begin by discussing the particular situation of Palestinian 
refugees under international law and the applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention. A 
discussion on cessation under Article 1C of the 1951 Convention will follow. The rationale for 
Article 1C and Article 12(4) of ICCPR, and the possible ways of interpreting these provisions 
will be examined to ascertain whether the two provisions are contradictory. Based on this 
analysis, it will be argued that the cessation clause does not necessarily terminate the right of 
return.  
 
A. Palestinian Refugees and the 1951 Convention 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the cessation clauses of the 1951 Convention, one should 
examine the special situation of the 1948 Palestinian refugees under international law and the 
applicability of the 1951 Convention. This discussion is needed because opinions on when and 
how the 1951 Convention applies to Palestinian refugees vary. 
Due to the circumstances that led to the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, 
Palestinian refugees are treated in a unique manner under the international refugee regime.97 
With the mass exodus of refugees in 1948 and 1949, the UN General Assembly created two UN 
bodies to deal with the issue. The first body, created in 1948, was the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP). Its mandate included, inter alia, the promotion 
of “a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine”98 and: 
 
[t]o facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the 
payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.99  
 
Thus, the UNCCP is supposed to have the mandate of protecting Palestinian refugees.100 In 1949, 
the UN created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA). UNRWA’s mandate was to provide assistance by carrying out a “direct relief 
and works programme”.101 UNRWA’s mandate was restricted to assistance, while protection fell 
within the mandate of UNCCP.102 Although the UNCCP still exists officially, it has been defunct 
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since the 1960s, and has ceased to fulfill its protection mandate.103 This has left the Palestinian 
refugees with very little protection, creating “a protection gap”.104 
According to Article 1D of the 1951 Convention, the Convention does not apply to refugees 
who receive protection or assistance from other UN agencies other than the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).105 Since other UN bodies deal with the issue of 
Palestinian refugees, the applicability of the 1951 Convention to Palestinian refugees is unclear. 
The way this Article applies to Palestinian refugees can be interpreted in a number of ways.106 
Lex Takkenberg, for example, argues that the first sentence of Article 1D, known as the 
“exclusion clause”, means that the 1951 Convention applies to Palestinian refugees falling under 
the mandate of UNRWA as long as they have the possibility of receiving assistance from 
UNRWA. Takkenberg’s emphasis here is on the possibility of receiving assistance, and not the 
actual receipt of assistance. He asserts that the second clause, also known as the “inclusion 
clause”, applies only when the possibility of getting assistance from UNRWA ceases to be 
available.107 In such situations, Palestinian refugees, as a category, will be entitled to the benefits 
of the 1951 Convention without making any determination whether the refugees meet the criteria 
of Article 1A(2).108 The UNHCR offers a somewhat different interpretation. According to its 
revised note from 2009,109 the UNHCR considers the 1948 Palestinian refugees, who are inside 
the area of operations of UNRWA, to fall within the exclusion clause in Article 1D, and if a 
refugee leaves the area of operation of UNRWA for any reason, the refugee will be included in 
the inclusion clause of Article 1D, without having to pass a new assessment under Article 1A, 
regardless of her ability to return to the area of operations of UNRWA.110  
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Susan Akram and Terry Rempel, on the other hand, argue that the most appropriate 
interpretation of Article 1D is to view it as a contingent inclusion clause, which will be triggered 
by the cessation of either protection or assistance by the two UN agencies, UNRWA and 
UNCCP. Since the UNCCP ceased to fulfill its mandate in the 1950s, the 1951 Convention and 
all of the guarantees and the rights it provides should apply to Palestinian refugees under the 
inclusion clause in Article 1D.111 Akram and Rempel further argue that Palestinian refugees 
should be entitled to the benefits under Article 1D of the 1951 Convention until their position is 
“being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations” as per the requirement of Article 1D, which in this case means 
that they are given the option to exercise their rights to return and compensation according to UN 
General Assembly Resolution 194(III).112  
To sum up this point, different opinions have been voiced on the question of the applicability 
of the 1951 Convention to the Palestinian refugees, and the extent and limits of its applicability. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a definitive answer on this issue, the 1951 Convention and the 
cessation clause remain relevant.  
 
B. International Refugee Law and the Focus on Protection 
 
The main international law instruments that deal with refugees and refugee status are the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The Statute of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees is also relevant.113 The definition of refugee 
in Article 1A of the 1951 Convention includes three key components: fear of persecution, being 
outside the country of nationality or habitual residence, and lack of protection.114 Refugee law is 
meant to deal with these three components. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits states 
from returning individuals who face an actual or well-founded fear of persecution. The other two 
components, alienage and the lack of protection, are addressed by the international community, 
which is working collectively to achieve durable solutions for refugees. Durable solutions are 
meant to provide options for refugees whereby the refugees can find permanent residence, and 
enjoy the protection of a state and cease to be a refugee. This obliges the international 
community to devote resources to deal with the problems created by the influx of people who are 
essentially aliens. International law, therefore, sees refugees as a problem for the international 
community, one that the international community should cooperate in resolving.115 Refugee 
status should be seen as temporary since it is a problem that should be resolved. It should be seen 
                                                                                                                                                             
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” (January 1992), 
online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html> [Handbook on Procedures and Criteria]. 
111
 Akram and Rempel, supra note 2 at 67. 
112
 Ibid., at 68. 
113; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force 4 October 
1967); UNHCR Statute, supra note 8. 
114
 Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, ibid. defines refugee as any person who: 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
115
 See Preamble to the 1951 Convention, ibid. 
23 
 
A version of this article has been accepted for publication by the Asian Journal of International  
Law, and will appear in a revised form subsequent to editorial input.  ©  Mazen Masri,  2014 
as an exception to the rule that people should enjoy the protection of their countries. How does 
cessation affect the other rights of the refugee, especially the right to return to the country of 
origin? Does cessation terminate or limit that right? In order to answer this question, one needs 
to examine the meaning of cessation and situate the discussion within the objectives and 
rationale of International Refugee Law (IRL). The interaction between the right of return and 
IRL should also be examined for inconsistencies and contradictions.  
At the heart of refugee law, and as its underlying rationale, lies the principle of protection. 
Refugee law is meant to determine when refugee status begins—a status which is triggered by 
alienage and the lack of protection by the state of origin. Once the status is determined, refugee 
law determines what kind of protection a refugee should be entitled to, the rights of the refugee 
and obligations of the host state until the status ceases.116 James Hathaway has put it clearly and 
succinctly when he said that the main purpose of refugee law:  
 
is to ensure that those whose basic rights are no protected (for a Convention reason) in their own country are, 
if able to reach an asylum state, entitled to invoke rights of substitute protection in any state party to the 
Refugee Convention.117  
 
Since refugee law sees refugee status as a problem, which is also a temporary phenomenon, it 
seeks to find permanent solutions for the refugee problem, which would secure that refugees or 
former refugees enjoy the necessary protection.118 
International law envisages three solutions for the refugee problem that would bring the 
refugee status to an end: integration in the country of refuge, resettlement in a third country, or 
voluntary repatriation, with the latter being the most desirable solution.119 The emphasis is on 
bringing refugee status to an end by providing a place of residency and protection. None of these 
instruments explicitly grants refugees the right to return to their own countries or homes. 
Refugee law mainly calls upon the relevant states to facilitate a solution, be it repatriation or 
assimilation within new national communities.120 Out of the three durable solutions, only 
repatriation represents an absolute obligation on a state, that is, the state of origin. No state is 
obliged to grant permanent status or citizenship to anyone other than “persons born in its 
territory who otherwise would be stateless”.121 Resettlement and absorption, therefore, represent 
discretionary grants of “grace” by the state, not a state obligation, while repatriation is a state 
obligation.122 The fact that return is seen as the most desirable solution does not mean that 
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refugee law is the sole source of that right. It is merely a reflection of what is usually seen as the 
desires of the refugees and the international community.123  
Even in the search for permanent solutions for refugees, the focus is mostly on protection. In 
the area of voluntary repatriation, for example, the focus is on two main points: the voluntary 
nature of the repatriation,124 and the refugee’s return in safety and with dignity. Safe return 
encompasses legal safety, such as “amnesties and personal safety, integrity, non-discrimination 
and freedom from fear of persecution or punishment upon return”.125 It also includes physical 
and material security.126 These are all elements of protection. In the area of resettlement and 
acquisition of a new nationality, two main points are important to note: the voluntary nature of 
the acquisition of the new nationality127 and the effectiveness of the nationality, that is, that it 
confers protection and rights that are fundamental to nationality.128 The voluntary nature of the 
acquisition of the nationality is important as involuntary acquisition of nationality does not result 
in the cessation of the refugee status.129   
Refugee law, as such, does not explicitly create a right to return which is specific to refugees, 
but it assumes its existence a priori. Since it already exists under international law, the role of 
refugee law regarding return is merely to induce the relevant parties to facilitate the voluntary 
repatriation of the refugees. Therefore, in the absence of any explicit provision, international 
refugee law instruments cannot be seen as sources of authority to abrogate the right. In fact, the 
trend that can be identified in the area of refugee law is deference to general human rights law. 
To this end, the UNHCR Executive Committee has stated that “[s]tates must continue to be 
guided, in their treatment of refugees, by existing international law and humanitarian principles 
and practice, bearing in mind the moral dimensions of providing refugee protection”.130 This is 
also consistent with the view that sees refugee rights as part of general international human rights 
law.131 As Hathaway has put it: “[r]efugee rights do not exist as an alternative to, or in 
competition with, general human right. Nor, however, has the evolution of a broad-ranging 
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system of general human rights treaties rendered the notion of refugee-specific rights 
redundant”.132  
Article 1C(3) of the 1951 Convention provides that the application of the Convention will 
cease if the refugee acquires a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of 
nationality. Again, we see that the emphasis is on the protection and the extent to which the new 
nationality can provide protection. This reinforces the assertion that the main focus in the 1951 
Convention is on protection, and that the cessation of the refugee status only examines and deals 
with the protection and its quality.133 Other paragraphs of Article 1C also highlight the issue of 
protection. For example, paragraph 1 states that the re-availment of the refugee of the protection 
of her country of nationality will bring the refugee status to an end. Paragraph 5 provides that 
compelling reasons, arising out of previous persecution, for the refugee’s refusal to avail herself 
of the protection of the country of nationality are an exception for the cessation of the refugee 
status because of the change of circumstances in the country of nationality. A similar exception 
also exists in paragraph 6, which deals with refugees who do not carry the nationality of the 
country of origin, but who are only habitual residences. Paragraph 2, which focuses the re-
acquisition of nationality also implicitly deals with protection, since nationality and the re-
acquisition of nationality constitute the supreme manifestation of the re-availment of protection 
of the country of origin.134 It is clear that the underlying rationale behind this clause is to 
determine when a refugee ceases to be in need of international protection, and when the “refugee 
problem” comes to an end. It is not intended to have any implications on the rights the refugee 
had before becoming a refugee. 
 
C. Interpretation of the 1951 Convention and the ICCPR: Contradiction or 
Harmony? 
 
As opposed to the 1951 Convention which deals with the relationship between the refugee and 
the country of refuge, Article 12(4) of the ICCPR deals with a right that is triggered by the 
arbitrary action of the refugee’s state of origin, which denies the refugee the right to enter the 
country. The Article’s focus is on the issue of freedom of movement and the relationship 
between the individual and the country she resides in, and the obligations that are imposed on 
states as a result of this link. The right, in this situation, is invoked vis-à-vis the state of origin. It 
is, therefore, clear that the 1951 Convention and the ICCPR are meant to serve different 
objectives and functions, and protect different interests, although there may be some, albeit 
minimal, overlap between them. Therefore, there is no contradiction in asserting that an 
individual retains the right to return even if her refugee status has been terminated. It may be the 
case that the lack of any apparent contradiction is the reason why authors who have written in 
support of the applicability of Article 12(4) of the ICCPR did not feel compelled to examine the 
impact of the cessation on the right of return. On the other hand, an argument can be made that 
the acquisition of a new citizenship terminates the right of return of the former refugee to her 
                                                 
132
 Ibid., at 75. 
133
 1951 Convention, supra note 5. See generally Joan FITZPATRICK, “The End of Protection: Legal Standards for 
Cessation of Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection” (1999) 13 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 343. 
134
 1951 Convention, ibid.; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra note 119 at 138. 
26 
 
A version of this article has been accepted for publication by the Asian Journal of International  
Law, and will appear in a revised form subsequent to editorial input.  ©  Mazen Masri,  2014 
country of origin. Lewis Saideman argues, based on his perceived contradiction between two 
treaty provisions, that  
 
[c]onventions and laws in general ought to be interpreted in a plain language manner that harmonizes them 
rather than in a manner that places them at odds with each other. If a refugee has accepted new nationality, he 
now has a place that he can “enter” and call home; his new state of protection is his “own country”.135 
 
From the outset, it should be explained that, as shown above, there is no conflict between 
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR and Article 1C of the 1951 Convention, since the 1951 Convention 
contains no provision abrogating the right of return. Nevertheless, even if a conflict does exist, 
does the interpretation that Saideman offers, which terminates the right to return, adhere to the 
rules of interpretation of treaties under international law? As shown in the analysis below, the 
answer is no. 
The interpretation of treaties is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.136 
The treaty is seen, more or less, as a restatement of customary international law,137 and is ratified 
by 108 states.138 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Article 31(2) stipulates that the 
context for the purpose of interpretation shall include, inter alia, the text, the preamble, and the 
annexes. The context of the ICCPR, as can be understood from its text and the preamble, is the 
guarantee, protection, and promotion of human rights in general, with a special emphasis on civil 
and political rights. Also, another leading principle in the interpretation of human right treaties, 
especially the ICCPR, is that provisions permitting derogations from rights and limitations on 
rights, should be construed in a strict and narrow manner.139 So even if the cessation clause is 
treated as a limitation clause, its scope and interpretation should be construed in a strict and 
narrow manner. 
With respect to the 1951 Convention, apart from the fact that it does not contain any provision 
indicating that cessation of refugee status can affect the right of return of the refugee, the 
preamble of the Convention begins by considering the “principle that human beings shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination”.140 It also considers the fact that the 
UN has “endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights 
and freedoms”.141 This emphasis on human rights shows that the object of the Convention is to 
provide humans with further rights, or create refugee-specific rights, but not to abrogate rights 
already in existence. Therefore, Article 1C of the 1951 Convention should not be construed in a 
way that limits and restricts human rights that were granted by other international law 
instruments.142 
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 Saideman further elaborates on this issue, and argues that even if a refugee is seen as having 
two nationalities, the acquisition of a new citizenship brings to an end the right of return to the 
state of origin. His argument is based on the assertion that international law does not compel 
recognition of dual citizenship, and even tries to limit it.143 He further argues that “the increasing 
phenomenon of toleration of dual citizenship does not indicate a widespread subjective sense of 
legal obligation on the part of states, but appears to be a gratuitous gesture by willing nations”.144 
Saidemen concludes that since recognition of dual citizenship is only permissible under 
international law and is not a right, “Article 12(4) of the CCPR ought to be interpreted to grant 
an individual a right to call only one country ‘his own’”.145 He does not, however, provide any 
reason as to why dual citizenship should not be recognized under the ICCPR even though it is 
permissible under international law. In addition, this argument seems to be outdated, and ignores 
the fact that nationality in the context of international human rights law is not nationality in the 
formal sense, but an effective and genuine link between the country and the individual. His 
assertions regarding dual citizenship do not reflect a rule of general international law. Although 
some treaties regard the restriction of the ability to have more than one nationality as desirable, 
and strive to reduce multiple nationalities,146 there are other treaties that tolerate multiple 
nationalities, and others that even encourage dual nationality.147 Thus, the treaties, which seek to 
restrict multiple nationalities, are seen as particular international law,148 and cannot be seen as a 
rule of general international law. International law on this point appears to be neutral. The 
argument, therefore, that the right of return can only be limited to one state because international 
law does not create an obligation to recognize multiple citizenship is not supported by the recent 
trends in the area. Such an interpretation also ignores the human rights context. The argument 
becomes even harder to sustain given that Israel itself tolerates multiple citizenship.   
In conclusion, the interpretation that Saideman provides cannot stand. The method of 
interpretation used, and the assertions and assumptions made, are contrary to universally 
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accepted rules of interpretation, and contrary to the principles and objectives of both 
Conventions. In fact, the proposed interpretation (which supposedly would result in greater 
harmonization of international law) comes with many risks. Refugee law aims at providing 
protection to refugees till their “refugee problem” is solved. It is also seen as a temporary status, 
until the “refugee problem” is solved and adequate protection is provided. To this end, the 
reduction of the number of refugees in the world by offering durable solutions is described as 
one of the goals of the UNHCR.149 At the same time, many refugees insist on returning to their 
state of origin, and refuse any other option that would risk their right to return. Harmonization in 
the manner proposed by Saideman may deter such refugees, who desire to return to their homes, 
from seeking to improve their situation and give up their status as refugees by acquiring a new 
nationality because this would compromise their ability to return to their country of origin.  
If for the sake of harmonization, refugees who wish to acquire a new nationality would be 
deprived of their right to return to the state of origin, many refugees may opt not to acquire a new 
nationality, and thus preserve their status as refugees, a status that is seen as “a problem”, and 
that international law aims at eradicating. Harmonization in this manner would decrease the 
number of refugees who would opt to terminate their refugee status, which would be at odds with 
the object of the 1951 Convention itself. This kind of harmonization would punish the refugee 
for attempting to improve her situation. It is also in contradiction with the principles and goals of 
the international refugee law system. In addition, the position suggested is flawed because it 
ignores the other different sources of law of the right of return.150 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The issue raised in this article deals mainly with the relationship between international refugee 
law and general human rights law. Although the emphasis is on Palestinian refugees, this 
question is relevant in the context of refugees that have been in exile for a long period of time, 
and seek to improve their situation by being naturalized in another state. It arises in a more acute 
way in situations of ethnic cleansing, or situations where the state of origin is not interested in 
repatriation because of the ethnicity, race, or social or group class of the refugees. Classic 
examples are conflicts that are ethnic or national in nature, especially in the context of state 
succession where issues of nationality become complex. 
The right of return to one’s own country, especially a refugee’s right of return, goes beyond 
the concept of citizenship or nationality. It is focused on the link between the individual and the 
territory, and on the interest of the individual in having a safe space to live in and thrive. 
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Sometimes, like in the situation of naturalization in a different country, this link is somehow 
weakened. In such situations, the weakening of the link should not automatically lead to a 
deprivation of rights. This is especially true in the case of refugees. The circumstances that led 
the refugees to leave their country of origin, the circumstances blocking their return, and the 
decisions made by the individuals in view of their available options should be examined. If the 
country of origin did not allow, or facilitate, the strengthening of relations with it, it would be 
difficult to argue that the individual has lost her link with that country, and thus the right to enter 
it. The right to return, therefore, is not contingent on formal nationality, but on a strong link 
between the individual and the territory. The fact that this link is weakened due to restrictions 
and measures by the state cannot be used to abrogate the link and the rights that stem from this 
link. 
The abrogation of the right of return, therefore, with all of the implications that it has for the 
link between the individual and the territory, is not a simple issue, and cannot be determined 
without taking into consideration the circumstances that caused the refugee’s departure and those 
that are blocking her return. The right is independent of the refugee status, even though it 
becomes more important and relevant in the case of refugees. Since the right of return is 
independent of the refugee status, the cessation of the latter should not necessarily abrogate the 
former. Although the refugee status is governed by refugee law, and at the same time the refugee 
is entitled to exercise the right to return under the ICCPR, this overlap should not be seen as a 
contradiction that needs to be reconciled. Both tools aspire to achieve different ends and protect 
different interests, and hence do not clash. One cannot expect that with the cessation of the 
refugee status, the refugee would relinquish all legal, social, and spiritual links with her country 
of origin. It is hard to conceive of the legal status of individuals as encompassing all aspects of 
her life, and as the determinate factor in deciding her belonging and links. Similarly, it would be 
naive and even ridiculous to see the acquisition of a new nationality as an event that “resets” the 
human experience, and as an event that transcends human belonging, social links, culture, and 
life.  
As James Hathaway argued, refugee law is not an alternative or a competitor to general 
human rights law. This notion is well-supported by the refugee law instruments and the practices 
of the international organizations dealing with refugees. This notion should be the guiding 
principle when dealing with the interaction between refugee law and general human right law.  
 
